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Like most law enforcement officers, I was required to handle informants (or “confidential human 
sources”) when I was an FBI Special Agent.  At the time, I had no idea that I would eventually 
leave government service for academia. However, seven years after going through New Agent 
Training at Quantico, I left the FBI to pursue my doctoral work in philosophy at the University 
of Virginia. This change came about for a variety of reasons, and most had nothing to do with the 
FBI.  But I did leave the FBI with vague concerns about the scope of law enforcement power.  
Upon arriving at the University of Virginia, then, there was little doubt that my work would in 
some way be an attempt to make sense of my concerns as an FBI agent.  One concern was about 
the police’s use of informants.  Consider the case, Alexander v. DeAngelo, in which an informant 
was tasked by the police to engage in a sex act as a way to gather evidence about a suspect’s use 
of prostitutes.  In denying the informant’s subsequent lawsuit, the court stated: 
[The informant] engaged in a sexual act, and not for pleasure. But confidential 
informants often agree to engage in risky undercover work in exchange for 
leniency, and we cannot think of any reason, especially any reason rooted in 
constitutional text or doctrine, for creating a categorical prohibition against the 
informant's incurring a cost that takes a different form from the usual risk of being 
beaten up or for that matter bumped off by a drug dealer with whom one is 
negotiating a purchase or sale of drugs in the hope of obtaining lenient treatment 
from the government. 
The opinion’s rationale is based in part upon the following: (1) The informant’s ability to bargain 
for potential leniency in exchange for engaging in the underlying act on behalf of the police, and 
(2) the police’s tactics did not rise to the level of a violation of the informant’s constitutional 
rights.   
Informants are motivated by all sorts of reasons; for example, some have a strong sense of 
patriotism and simply want to help the police.  But consider the more limited case of informants 
who are tasked by the police to engage in risky undercover operations when the police have 
leverage over the informant (e.g., the police have evidence that the informant committed a 
crime).  Ultimately, I think these situations highlight the extent to which the police’s 
discretionary authority can be an affront to basic rule of law principles. 
It is interesting to explore how the bargaining process involved in agreements between the police 
and informants resembles the bargaining process associated with contracts.  This has led me to 
the view that the underlying principles of the legal doctrine of unconscionability provide weight 
in determining the extent to which these informant-police agreements are justified.  
Consider first how these agreements are similar to contracts:  There is an offer by the police for 
the informant to provide operational assistance, the informant accepts (or does not accept) the 
offer, and there is consideration for the agreement (the police consider recommending leniency 
for the informant in exchange for the informant’s assistance).  One need not be committed to the 
idea that informant-police agreements give rise to legally enforceable contracts.  This is because 
the bargaining process raises other normative principles—which have weight—underpinning the 
doctrine of unconscionability. 
Ronald Dworkin made the point this way:  Rules are “all or nothing” standards that resolve 
particular cases conclusively when applicable—say, when Joe drives 80 mph and the speed limit 
is 55 mph.  Principles are not dispositive in the cases to which they apply.  Competing principles 
may be incommensurate, requiring that cases to which they apply are resolved based upon 
justificatory weight. Although the doctrine of unconscionability might not resolve informant-
police agreements, its underlying normative principles might provide weight with respect to 
those agreements. 
The typical context for the doctrine of unconscionability is the sale of goods, but the doctrine’s 
underlying normative principles are steeped in common law—as illustrated by this oft-quoted, 
centuries old description: “An unconscionable agreement is one such as no man in his senses and 
not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on 
the other.” 
The modern legal framework includes procedural unconscionability (no real choice and 
inadequate knowledge of the agreement) and substantive unconscionability (contract terms that 
are unreasonably favorable to one party).  With respect to the procedural component, police hold 
almost all the power over informants and can implicitly threaten informants with a complete loss 
of liberty (prison).  Moreover, untrained informants are often unable to appreciate the risks and 
contingences that come with dangerous law enforcement operations.   
One might ask the following question with respect to the substantive component: Should 
untrained citizens conduct the risk-laden, otherwise illegal activity of police, as required by some 
informant-police agreements?  I think there is good reason to answer this question in the negative 
to the extent that such agreements are an affront to some facet of the informant’s liberal 
personhood.  I’ve developed a tripartite conception of liberal personhood, with the first two 
facets—reciprocator (having to do with one’s equal legal and social status) and moral agent 
(having to do with one’s capacity for certain natural properties that allow one to be treated as 
free and responsible)—giving rise to the third facet, human dignity (which has both a social and 
moral component).  There are a variety of ways that informant-police agreements may count as 
an affront to one or more of these facets.   
A tragic case study involves the police’s use of Rachel Hoffman, who was a college senior when 
she was first incriminated regarding her use and sale of marijuana.  She was potentially liable for 
felony charges and prison, and the police offered to consider reducing her liability in exchange 
for her meeting two convicted felons alone in her car to buy 2.5 oz. of cocaine, 1500 Ecstasy 
pills, and a handgun.  The police provided Hoffman with a recording device, transmitter, and 
cash to purchase the drugs and the gun.  However, on the day of the sting, the targets changed the 
meeting location and the police lost track of Hoffman.  Two days later she was found dead—
having been shot by the gun she was sent to buy. 
Was the agreement between the police and Hoffman justified?  Did Hoffman have a meaningful 
choice about whether to accept the terms of the police’s offer?  Did she have adequate 
knowledge of the risks involved?  If the police’s broad discretionary power to engage in law-
breaking activity qualifies as a departure from rule of law principles, was subjecting Hoffman to 
such risky police duties less like enhancing her options and more like an illegitimate liberty 
deprivation?  Was Hoffman’s harm tied to a disparity in benefits that weighed heavily in favor of 
the police?  These are of course difficult questions, but I think an examination of the procedural 
and substantive components of informant-police agreements can be illuminating.    
Just as all contracts are not unconscionable, it would not be right to say that all informant-police 
agreements are unconscionable. On the other hand, many of these agreements—such as the one 
in Hoffman’s case— do seem unconscionable prima facie because features of the agreement 
track the central characteristics of the doctrine of unconscionability and its underlying normative 
commitments.   
Unfortunately, unenforceability is often not a viable remedy in the case of informant-police 
agreements.  Such remedies would come far too late in cases such as Hoffman’s. This lends 
support to the view that facially unconscionable informant-police agreements should be 
construed as unjustified from the outset—and our policing policies should be crafted 
accordingly.   
